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Locked Up: Fear, Racism, Prison
Economics, and the Incarceration of
Native Youth
Addie C. Rolnick

Introduction
In the national conversation about juvenile overincarceration and disproportionate
minority contact within the juvenile justice system,1 Native American youth are
often statistically invisible.2 Closer attention, however, reveals that Native youth who
come into contact with the juvenile justice system are more likely to be locked in
secure confinement than other youth,3 with disproportionality rates in some localities exceeding those experienced by Black and Latino youth.4 Many Native youth are
incarcerated after they come into contact with federal or state courts, so one potential
remedy for overincarceration is to move more Native youth out of federal and state
courts and invest in tribal juvenile justice systems. Little is known, however, about
whether youth adjudicated in tribal courts experience less incarceration and, more
broadly, about the role of incarceration in tribally run systems and potential barriers to
reducing incarceration there.
This article examines available information on Native youth in tribal juvenile
justice systems during the fifteen-year period from 1998 to 2013. Although that information is limited, it suggests incarceration was a central feature of tribal juvenile justice
systems and related federal policy. At least sixteen new juvenile facilities were built to
house youth under the jurisdiction of tribal courts during this time,5 and many more
juvenile facilities were upgraded, even though the total number of juveniles housed
in incarceration facilities remained constant or declined.6 Incarceration appears to
Addie C. Rolnick is an associate professor at the William S. Boyd School of Law, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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have been a primary tool used to address drug, alcohol, and other nonviolent offenses.
Various factors contributed to this investment in secure detention, and this article
demonstrates that tribal governments are not immune from the forces that moved
juvenile justice policy in a more punitive direction from the 1970s until very recently.
A chorus of voices has recognized the problem of overincarceration of Native
youth, including the Indian Law and Order Commission and the Attorney General’s
Task Force on American Indian and Alaska Native Youth Exposed to Violence.7 In
recent years, the pendulum of federal policy appears to be swinging back in a direction
that favors decarceration and greater tribal control. The Obama Administration has
been far more cautious about juvenile incarceration recently, reflecting a change in the
national conversation.8
While this may represent a turning point, this article is intended as a note of
caution. Lack of tribal control over juvenile justice is a problem in itself, but the fact
that greater tribal authority is frequently offered as a solution to the particular problem
of overincarceration relies on the assumption that tribal juvenile justice systems will
automatically be less punitive than nontribal ones. The significant financial investment
in the incarceration of Native youth under the jurisdiction of tribal systems during this
fifteen-year period should raise doubts about this assumption.
The investment in juvenile incarceration occurred against the backdrop of a broader
phenomenon of prison-building that occurred in jurisdictions across the United States
beginning in the late 1970s and peaking in the 1990s. Although the precise historical
trajectory and degree of the prison boom has varied among states and localities, across
the United States it has been remarkably consistent.9 Building more prisons, of course,
is closely tied to the phenomenon of mass incarceration—a term that describes shifts
in criminal law and criminal justice policies, which have resulted in the imprisonment
of a substantial proportion of the American population, particularly Black and Brown
men and women,10 often for nonviolent offenses.11
Hence, the story of Indian country juvenile incarceration during this time period
must be situated in the context of a larger story about prison expansion and the
relationship of prisons to minority populations. The choices to invest in prisons and
to pursue criminal justice policies that center incarceration are not made in a vacuum.
The unprecedented rise in incarceration rates in the United States “cannot simply be
ascribed to a higher level of crime today compared with the early 1970s, when the
prison boom began.”12 Rather, the nationwide rise in incarceration resulted from a
coalescence of factors that include legal changes that criminalized new behaviors
and mandated longer sentences, making entire communities into potential prisoners,
and also the role of prisons in generating jobs and revenue in communities that were
starved for both. Although the vogue of imprisonment affected both the juvenile and
adult systems, the shift in juvenile justice policy was particularly pronounced as the
justification for juvenile confinement shifted from therapeutic rehabilitation to tough
punishment.13
The critical literature on imprisonment and mass incarceration reveals three main
themes that are important in the tribal context. First, prison construction cannot be
explained simply as a response to skyrocketing violent crime rates. This is important to
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understand because it highlights the need for tribal leaders to look closely at any claim
that more secure juvenile facilities are needed because there are more violent juvenile
offenders. Second, prison construction has been driven by fear, including racialized
perceptions of crime, and the increase in the number of prisoners is largely attributable
to the criminalization of nonviolent behaviors that were previously addressed through
means other than incarceration. Indeed, the limited data available indicate that the
majority of youth in tribal detention facilities are being held for low-level nonviolent
offenses that are often linked to drug and alcohol abuse.14 These are exactly the types
of offenses that experts agree are better addressed by alternatives to incarceration, and
perhaps even by diversion out of the juvenile justice system. Third, economic incentives
can be a significant factor in prison expansion. Most tribal communities have high
unemployment rates and very little available funding for government infrastructure.
Where federal money is available to support prison construction—and especially if
tribal leaders envision those prisons becoming economically self-sufficient, creating
jobs where there were none, or generating a profit—a tribe will have strong reasons
to prioritize incarceration that have nothing to do with justice policy. In other words,
secure juvenile facilities, like all prisons, can be part of a self-perpetuating system.
The purpose of this article is to critically examine the idea that self-determination
is a solution to juvenile incarceration by considering the factors that contribute to
overincarceration of Native youth within tribal systems. Tribes are not immune to
the forces described here, especially given the influence of federal policies on tribal
systems. Tribal leaders working to build their juvenile justice systems between 1998
and 2013 were making policy decisions in an era when incarceration was seen as a
major piece of juvenile justice policy across the country, a view that shaped the federal
policies affecting Indian country, the types of assistance available to tribes, and even
the seemingly independent judgments of tribal communities.
The point is not to condemn tribes for engaging in a project of mass incarceration,
or even to claim that the phenomenon of juvenile incarceration in Indian country is
identical to mass incarceration elsewhere; it is undoubtedly different in important
ways.15 Instead, I hope to link existing research from outside Indian country on
imprisonment and mass incarceration with the policy conversation about building
effective tribal justice systems, which until recently has tended to focus almost exclusively on law enforcement and the need for tribal governments to have more access to
imprisonment as a tool of criminal and juvenile justice.16 Tribes are uniquely positioned to be able to learn from the mistakes of other jurisdictions, and this article is
intended to encourage tribal leaders to engage with difficult questions surrounding
criminal justice policy, and the role of incarceration, as they build and strengthen
their juvenile justice systems. As tribes exert more control over their own systems,
and express their policy choices more strongly to federal decision-makers, they will
have more freedom to rebuild their juvenile systems in a way that doesn’t reproduce
the mistakes that state and local governments have made, but this can only happen
if they understand the subtle factors that contribute to overincarceration and make a
concerted effort to counteract them.
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Native Youth, Overincarceration,
Solution

and the

Self-Determination

The juvenile justice system in Indian country has been the target of significant criticism in recent years.17 It has been referred to in media coverage as “antiquated” and
“broken.”18 Federal reports condemn it as “expos[ing] the worse consequences of our
broken Indian country justice system” and specifically conclude that it “retraumatizes
[Native American] children” and is “failing the next generation.”19 Overreliance on
incarceration, especially by federal and state authorities, is a primary aspect of this
failure. Recommendations aimed at reducing incarceration and undoing some of
the damage done to Native youth by the juvenile justice system have focused on the
strategy of strengthening tribal justice systems, which are often assumed to be less
likely to rely on incarceration to address juvenile delinquency. Yet a review of available
data regarding incarceration facilities on tribal lands reveals an investment of federal
and tribal money in building and operating secure juvenile facilities that dwarfs the
investment in alternative models.

Incarceration Hurts Native Youth
Research has shown that Native youth as a group20 are especially vulnerable and
traumatized.21 Compared to other groups and compared to the general population,
Native youth are especially vulnerable in almost every area identified as a risk factor
for delinquency.22 They are poorer.23 Many live in communities with few social safety
net services.24 They are likely to face physical25 and mental26 health problems. They
are more likely to drop out of school27 and less likely to attain higher education.28
They are likely to struggle with drug and alcohol use.29 They are likely to contemplate and commit suicide.30 They are likely to be abused31 or to be victims of violent
crime.32 Native youth are particularly likely to be exposed to some form of violence
in their lives, including being victims of child abuse, witnessing domestic violence,
and witnessing interpersonal violence in their communities.33 Present-day trauma
compounds the impact of historical traumas that Native communities have experienced, including forced removal from homelands, targeted killing, wars, disease
outbreaks, brutal boarding schools designed to forcibly disconnect Native children
from their cultures, and family ties broken or damaged through adoption and relocation,34 all of which places Native youth at a greater risk of involvement in the juvenile
justice system.
In spite of their incredible vulnerability, Native youth face overly harsh sanctions
once they enter the legal system. They are overrepresented in foster care,35 in arrests
for certain offenses,36 in petitions for status offenses,37 especially liquor law violations,38
in out-of-home delinquency placements,39 in secure confinement,40 and among youth
prosecuted in the adult criminal system.41 In states and counties with relatively large
Native American populations, where Native incarceration can best be compared to
the incarceration rates for youth of other races, the data reveal stark disparities.42 For
example, a 2014 report on the Wisconsin juvenile justice system found that Native
youth are nearly twice as likely to be arrested and nearly twice as likely to be detained
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following arrest compared to white youth, with little change in the disparity between
2006 and 2012. In certain counties, the disparity was even greater: Native youth were
more than four times as likely to be arrested in Brown county and nearly seven times
as likely to be detained in Milwaukee county.43 A 2005 study found that, although only
1 percent of the Minnesota population is Native American, more than 15 percent of
those confined in the state juvenile correctional facility were Native youth.44
Yet research focused on juvenile justice policy “demonstrates that the current
system of intensive oversight and placement of youth in large prison-like facilities
has, at best, only a modest positive effect on recidivism, and can actually have negative
effects, while therapeutic programs focused on youth development have very positive effects, even for youth who commit serious offenses.”45 In state systems, juvenile
justice policymakers now recommend replacing training schools and large incarceration facilities with smaller, regional therapeutic facilities as a model for improving
juvenile justice and diverting non-dangerous offenders out of the system entirely.46 A
2011 report by the Annie E. Casey Foundation presents a compelling case that incarceration is a bad policy for juvenile offenders because it is ineffective, unnecessary, and
dangerous. According to the report, incarceration has little or no public safety benefit,
wastes money, harms youth, and does not reduce recidivism.47
In response to this building consensus, and to the voices of tribal leaders and
Native juvenile justice professionals, both the Indian Law and Order Commission
and the Attorney General’s Task Force on American Indian and Alaska Native Youth
Exposed to Violence have strongly recommended that incarceration should be used
only as a last resort for youth who pose a danger to themselves or the community,
and that investments be made instead in alternatives to juvenile incarceration.48 This
approach recognizes that incarceration is “not effective as a deterrent to delinquent
behavior” and that to center incarceration in the current approach to juvenile justice is
“another infliction of violence” on Native children that reinforces their trauma.49
Efforts to reduce overreliance on incarceration for Native youth have targeted
nontribal governments as the primary culprits. Because of the tangled web of criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands, many Native youth who commit offenses within
Indian country are prosecuted by federal or state governments with no regard to tribal
government preferences.50 Youth who commit offenses outside of Indian country
are adjudicated in state or local systems with no requirement to notify the child’s
tribe or involve it in the disposition.51 According to the 2013 report of the Indian
Law and Order Commission, “Data show that Federal and State juvenile justice
systems take Indian children, who are the least well, and make them the most incarcerated. When they do incarcerate them, it is often far from their homes, diminishing
prospects for positive contacts with their communities. Furthermore, conditions of
detention often contribute to the very trauma that American Indian and Alaska Native
children experience.”52

Self-Determination as a Solution to Overincarceration
If Native youth are facing overincarceration in state and federal systems, one possible
solution—one not available to other minority youth, who are also disproportionately
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incarcerated—is to strengthen and expand tribal juvenile justice systems. This can be
accomplished for Indian country youth without drastic changes to the law because
tribes have either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over almost all Native youth who
commit offenses within tribal territory.53 Tribes were exercising governing authority
over their people and their territory well before the state and federal governments were
created. Like other nations, their right to govern is inherent in their status as nations.
Federal law recognizes that the source of tribes’ governing power is their inherent
sovereignty, and that tribes consequently retain “those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status.” 54 Although the form and precise nature of their governing authority has
changed over time, they continue to exercise this authority.
Juvenile delinquency jurisdiction—disciplining, controlling, teaching, and caring
for children—is a key aspect of this inherent authority. As a general rule, a tribe at
least has juvenile delinquency jurisdiction in any case in which it would have criminal
jurisdiction if the offender were an adult. Again as a general rule, this includes offenses
committed by any Indian person, whether or not a member of that tribe,55 on land that
qualifies as tribal territory.56 Except for a small subset of domestic violence offenders,
tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.57 Tribal youth who are adjudicated
for status or delinquency offenses outside Indian country are generally subject to state
jurisdiction, although they may also be subject to tribal jurisdiction if they are placed
in foster care or for adoption as a result.58 This means that the decisions made by
tribal governments in constructing a juvenile justice system will affect mainly Native
youth within the tribe’s territory, and not Native youth living elsewhere or non-Native
youth who commit offenses on tribal land.
With regard to Native youth who commit offenses in tribal territory, tribes have
jurisdiction over a full range of criminal offenses as long as those offenses are defined as
crimes under tribal law. However, tribal jurisdiction is no longer recognized as exclusive
in some areas. Most notably, the federal government exercises concurrent jurisdiction
over Native youth who commit major crimes in Indian country.59 In addition, some
states were granted concurrent criminal and/or juvenile delinquency jurisdiction over
Indian country within their borders by federal statute: Public Law 280 is the primary
such law,60 but there are others.61 However, the existence of concurrent federal or state
power does not strip the tribe of its inherent jurisdiction. Furthermore, tribes are the
only sovereign with jurisdiction over minor offenses committed by Native youth in
Indian country not subject to Public Law 280 or a similar law.62
Federal law imposes minimal restrictions on tribal juvenile delinquency jurisdiction over Native youth. The main restriction that federal law imposes on tribal criminal
courts is one of sentence length: tribes in most cases may not sentence an offender to
more than one year in jail or prison, or up to three years if the tribe’s laws comply with
certain federal requirements.63 Federal law requires that tribal criminal courts comply
with most of the same basic due-process requirements applicable to federal and state
courts, with greater protections required for longer sentences.64 Because the term of
incarceration arising from a delinquency adjudication is typically shorter than an adult
sentence, and because delinquency jurisdiction may terminate when a juvenile reaches
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eighteen or twenty-one years of age, the federal law restriction on sentence length
doesn’t constrain juvenile courts to the same extent it does adult criminal courts.
Non-incarceration measures, like juvenile drug/wellness courts, may be able to operate
free of some of the due-process requirements that federal law imposes in cases where
incarceration may result. It can also be argued that certain juvenile delinquency laws,
such as those addressing status offenses and those that do not rely on incarceration,
are more appropriately categorized as a form of civil power, which would render even
these restrictions irrelevant. 65
The precise scope of juvenile delinquency jurisdiction exercised by each tribe is a
matter of tribal law. The important point is that federal law imposes very few restrictions on tribal power in this area. A tribe’s juvenile delinquency jurisdiction is at least
as broad as its criminal jurisdiction, and arguably broader. While it may exist concurrently with federal or state jurisdiction, the existence of broad tribal power means
that federal and state jurisdiction could effectively be limited—and primary authority
lodged with tribal governments—without a significant change in the law regarding
tribal jurisdiction.66
Indeed, the Law and Order Commission specifically recommends removing Native
children from federal and state jurisdiction whenever possible with the goal of “releasing
Tribes from dysfunctional Federal and State controls and empowering them to provide
locally accountable, culturally informed self-government,” echoing the recommendations
of other experts.67 This approach is consistent with the policy of self-determination
espoused by the executive and legislative branches of the federal government since at
least 1970,68 the nation-building model embraced by political scientists and economists,69 and the sovereignty principle that forms the bedrock of federal Indian law.70
There are several reasons to assume that tribes would rely less on incarceration.
Tribal justice systems that incorporate tribal culture and tradition tend to be less
focused on adversarial process and individualized punishment and more focused
on restorative justice, community well-being, treatment, and healing.71 In addition
to culturally specific beliefs about justice, a tribal system might also be guided by
culturally specific beliefs about youth. For many tribes, these include beliefs about
the importance of respect and guidance for youth who have gotten into trouble.72
All of these factors suggest that, given the freedom to design a juvenile justice system
appropriate for their community, many tribal governments would choose one that
emphasizes treatment, traditional approaches, and community-based intervention over
incarceration and punishment.

Incarceration of Youth under Tribal Jurisdiction
Whether this vision of responsive tribal justice systems as a remedy for overincarceration will bear out in practice is a question that has received very little scholarly or
political attention. In fact, however, during the fifteen-year period covered here, the
number of secure juvenile correctional facilities in Indian country steadily increased,
and tribes continue to push for funding to build even more. This section sets forth the
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available federal data, supplemented by information collected informally by others, on
Indian country facilities overall and Indian country juvenile facilities specifically.73
Juvenile facilities are a subset of all detention/correctional facilities on tribal lands.74
Unless a tribe contracts with a neighboring state or county facility to house youth, these
facilities hold Native youth adjudicated in tribal courts.75 A substantial portion of the
construction funding comes from competitive grants administered by the Department
of Justice (DOJ). Once they are built, some facilities are run directly by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA). Others are operated by tribes but funded at least in part by the
Bureau pursuant to self-determination contracts or self-governance compacts.76 A few
tribes operate correctional facilities without any assistance from the BIA, and these do
not necessarily appear in the Bureau’s inventory, which is the source of most of the data
cited here.
As the following tables show, the number of facilities on tribal lands increased
between 1998 and 2013, with about half of the net increase due to the construction
of new juvenile facilities. The number of juveniles held in Indian country facilities,
however, held steady or declined during the same time period, with a minority held for
violent offenses. The following tables show this apparent trend. Subsequent sections
provide further explanation and context.

Adult

Table 1
and Juvenile Facilities
Year
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Combined

Total # Of Facilities

1998

69

1999

69

2000

69

2001

68

2002

70

2003

70

2004

6877

2005

—78

2006

—

2007

83

2008

82

2009

8079

2010

75

2011

75

2012

80

2013

79
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As shown in table 1, between 1998 and 2004 the number of correctional facilities
located on tribal lands remained relatively steady at between sixty-eight and seventy.
By 2007, there were eighty-three facilities, and the number has fluctuated between
seventy-nine and eighty-three since then. In 2013, there were seventy-nine facilities.
Two dozen new facilities were built during this time period, resulting in a net increase
of ten facilities.80

Inmates

Table 2
in Juvenile and Adult Facilities
Year

Mid-Year Count

1998

1567

1999

1693

2000

179982

2001

2030

2002

2080

2003

1908

2004

1745

2005

Combined81

—83

2006

—

2007

2163

2008

2135

2009

2176

2010

2119

2011

2239

2012

2364

2013

2287

As shown in table 2, the total number of inmates held in all facilities was 1,567
in 1998. That number rose to 2080 by 2002, then fell between 2003 and 2004. It
increased substantially between 2004 and 2007, the same time period in which fifteen
more facilities were added to the BIA’s inventory. It is not clear from this data whether
and how the investment in new facility construction is related to the increase in the
inmate population in particular years, but the trends (more facilities and more inmates
in those facilities) at least roughly correspond. The total number of people held in
Indian country facilities has remained relatively level since, fluctuating between 2,100
and 2,300.
The number of facilities designed specifically to house juveniles increased as part
of the investment in prison construction.

Rolnick | Locked Up

63

Table 3
Juvenile Facilities
Year

Facilities Authorized to Hold
Juveniles

Facilities Holding Juveniles at
Mid-Year

Stand-Alone Juvenile Facilities

1998

43

22

7

1999

43

17

7

2000

—

32

—84

2001

—

35

—

2002

—

33

—

2003

—

29

—

2004

45

16

1186

2005

—

—

—87

2006

—

—

—

2007

—

20

—

2008

—

24

—

2009

—

23

—

2010

—

21

—

2011

—

23

—

2012

—

26

—

2013

34

23

1389

85

88

In 1998, twenty-two facilities held juveniles, seven of which were stand-alone
juvenile facilities.90 In 2004, sixteen facilities held juveniles; eleven of these were
stand-alone juvenile facilities, and others had sections specifically designed for
juveniles.91 In 2013 there were thirty-four operational facilities authorized to hold
juveniles. Of those, thirteen were stand-alone juvenile facilities, eleven included adults
and juveniles in the same building, but employed separate staff for juveniles,92 and
ten housed adults and juveniles together.93 Seven more juvenile facilities were slated
to open in the coming years, and at least one of these was planned as a stand-alone
juvenile facility.94
Unlike the adult offender population, the number of juveniles held was lower in
2013 than it was fifteen years earlier. Indian country facilities held 303 juveniles in
1998 and 190 juveniles in 2013. Prior to 2003, the mid-year count of juveniles was
over three hundred in three different years. The number of juvenile inmates has not
been higher than 257 in any year since 2007. According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, juveniles were 16 percent of the total inmate population in 2000, but only
8 percent in 2013.97
The number of separate juvenile facilities in Indian country nearly doubled during
the period covered here, while the number of juveniles being held in them decreased.
In June 2013, counting only stand-alone juvenile facilities, there was a separate juvenile
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Table 4
Juvenile Inmates—All Facilities
Year

Mid- Year Count

Juvenile Held as Adults

1998

303

26

1999

267

20

2000

277

14

2001

312

22

2002

307

11

2003

278

5

2004

198

3

2005

—

—

2006

—

—

2007

253

—96

2008

253

—

2009

257

—

2010

253

—

2011

237

—

2012

248

—

2013

190

—

95

facility for every fourteen youth being held in Indian country.98 To the best of my
knowledge, all of the facilities included in the federal inventory are built to the highest
security level. In other words, they are functionally equivalent to juvenile prisons. In
one sense, the growth in separate juvenile facilities is a positive development because it
means that fewer youth are being incarcerated in facilities designed for adult incarceration.99 However, the substantial financial investment required to construct and operate
at least six new juvenile facilities, and upgrade or replace others, does not appear to be
supported by a need for more bed space because the population of juveniles in facilities
has decreased.
A minority of youth being held in these facilities are incarcerated as a result
of violent offenses. More commonly, they are incarcerated for theft offenses and
substance-abuse-related offenses such as driving under the influence, public intoxication, or other drug offenses. The following table shows a rough count of the number of
juveniles held in Indian country facilities in June 2013 by type of offense.100
Of a total of 164 juveniles held in sixteen designated juvenile facilities at mid-year, 23
percent (38) were being held for violent offenses101 and five percent (9) were being held
for property offenses. Twenty percent (33) were being held for drug or alcohol-related
offenses. If one justification for incarcerating juveniles is the public safety threat posed
by violent offenders, it is noteworthy that less than one-quarter of the juveniles held in
secure confinement as a result of tribal court involvement committed violent offenses.
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Table 5
Juvenile Inmates by Offense Type–2013
Offense Type

Number of Juveniles Inmates at Mid-Year

Total Violent

38

Domestic Violence
Assault

8
18

Rape/Sexual Assault

6

Other Violent

6

Total Property

9

Burglary

5

Larceny-Theft

4

Total Drug/Alcohol

33

Public Intoxication

27

DWI

0

Drug Offense

5

Other

84

By authorizing specific grant programs and funding streams, Congress sets the
basic parameters for how money can be spent, and the direction of federal money
certainly influences the character of tribal juvenile justice systems. These parameters
constrain the agencies to some degree, but agencies have the discretion to make certain
choices that can more subtly impact tribal systems, such as how to train correctional staff or what standards a facility must meet in order to qualify for operational
funding.102
Congress’ investment of federal funds in improving and expanding incarceration
facilities on tribal lands far exceeded its investment in other possible solutions, such
as diverting youth out of the system entirely or investing in nonsecure facilities or
alternative programs. Between 1997 and 2004, the DOJ provided over $150 million
in grants to tribes to build incarceration facilities.103 During the same period, the
BIA received $637 million for law enforcement services (an umbrella category that
includes policing and detention/corrections but also covers other aspects of tribal
justice systems), plus an additional $31.5 million specifically designated for operation,
maintenance, and staffing of newly constructed facilities.104 From 2005 to 2009, the
Bureau’s detention budget increased again by 48 percent.105 By contrast, the Tribal
Youth Program, the primary source of DOJ funding for nonincarceration alternatives
for youth in tribal systems, has received annual funding between $10 million and $13
million every year from 1999 to 2008.106
For youth who arguably require removal from home, little funding has been
directed toward creating nonsecure placement options in tribal communities.107 Tribal
governments rely on these sources of federal funding to build their systems, so the
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gross imbalance between the federal investments in incarceration versus non-incarceration alternatives necessarily constrains their ability to reduce reliance on incarceration.
Moreover, tribes cannot necessarily reprogram funding between categories, so a tribe
that elected to close its incarceration facility may not be permitted to redirect those
funds toward alternative programs.108 In 2014, the Attorney General’s Task Force on
Native Youth Exposed to Violence found most Native youth in the juvenile justice
system are charged with low-level offenses that “normally would not be subject to
detention,” but that “the lack of alternatives and diversion programs force the system to
use detention as shelter.”109

The Lure

and

Trap

of

Prisons

Given the many reasons we might expect tribally run systems to avoid reliance on
incarceration, the focus on construction of secure confinement facilities is surprising.
The following sections consider some of the structural factors that may help explain
why incarceration has become such an important centerpiece of tribal juvenile justice
systems during the past two decades.

Prisons, Crime, and Fear
Across the United States, the number of prisons and the number of people in prison
have both increased dramatically over the past several decades,110 a shift that has been
particularly acute with regard to juvenile offenders.111 For juvenile justice, the general
shift toward imprisonment that began in the 1970s was followed by a second push for
more punitive policies in the 1980s and 1990s, in which a brief rise in violent juvenile
crime fed public fear, which translated into a demand for even harsher sentences.112
Tracking this shift, federal laws authorized increasingly harsh penalties for federal
crimes and prioritized incarceration at the state and local level.113
It may seem easy to assume that this expansion has happened because communities have faced more and more crime: more people committing crimes, more crimes
committed by those people, and/or an increase in violent or serious crime requiring
imprisonment. Criminal justice scholars, however, have demonstrated that this is not
the case. Violent crime did increase in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in more violent
offenders in prisons, but the far more dramatic increase in the prison population was
among nonviolent offenders.114 Most were convicted of nonviolent offenses involving
drug possession, sale, or use.115 Violent crime has since fluctuated, falling in the early
1980s, rising again in the late 1980s, and falling again in the early 1990s.116 The
homicide rate among youth, however, rose in the mid-1980s and continued to rise
until it reached its apex in 1994. Zimring has described this late-1980s spike in juvenile homicides and discusses how incorrect projections about worsening violent crime
fed rhetoric about a coming generation of “juvenile killers,” a massive increase in young
“muggers, killers, and thieves,” and a wave of juvenile “superpredators.”117 Despite dire
predictions, what followed was “the most sustained and substantial decline in youth
homicide in modern US history,” yet the impact of the resulting fear of crime resulted
in an increase in incarceration that continued even after violent crime plummeted.118
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Juvenile confinement rates outside Indian country increased steadily until 1997, when
they began a decline.119
In the tribal context, an increase in violent crime on reservations in the 1990s
triggered a 1997 report calling for more law enforcement resources in Indian country.
After consultation with over two hundred tribes, the Executive Committee for
Indian Country Law Enforcement Improvements released a report to the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Interior on Indian country law enforcement needs.
According to the report, violent crime in general and homicide specifically “rose
sharply” in Indian country between 1992 and 1996, when throughout the rest of the
country homicide and other violent crime declined.120 The report also cited a general
lack of law enforcement resources in Indian country, and a number of jails and
prisons that did not meet minimum safety and security standards. The report refers
to “the rise in juvenile crime on Indian lands,” but only quantifies the increase for
one tribe.121 It notes, however, that “[v]iolent Indian gangs, who model themselves
after their urban counterparts, are a frightening new reality on many reservations”
and offers anecdotes of apparent gang attacks, which may or may not have been
carried out by juveniles.122 Juvenile justice was certainly affected by the resulting
investment in law enforcement and detention resources. As Kevin Washburn has
described it, tribes advocating for more law enforcement authority and resources
“hopp[ed] aboard a moving train,” leveraging a national “War on Crime” to enhance
tribal justice systems.123
Following the 1997 report, the BIA centralized its law enforcement and public
safety services, which meant that detention and corrections activities would be overseen by the national office, rather than by various regional offices.124 The DOJ and the
BIA collaborated on a major prison-construction initiative, investing over $150 million
throughout the next several years in building and upgrading correctional facilities
on tribal lands, and the BIA received an additional $31.5 million to operate the new
facilities.125 The DOJ provided construction grants to tribes on a competitive basis,
and the BIA agreed to provide operational funding for these facilities. Between 1997
and 2003, BIA budget documents state that eighteen facilities were constructed or
upgraded, including at least six juvenile facilities.126 Building new prisons was framed
as a critical step in upgrading and strengthening tribal justice systems, a way to keep
inmates safe, and a response to violent crime.127
In 2004, the Office of the Inspector General investigated Indian country detention
and correctional facilities and released its results in a report titled “Neither Safe Nor
Secure.” The investigation revealed an alarming number of fatalities, suicides, suicide
attempts, injuries, and escapes, including several high-profile incidents involving juveniles,128 and it criticized the BIA for poor oversight. The investigation also criticized
the agency’s management of money, finding that several newly built facilities remained
unopened and that the Bureau could not properly account for millions of dollars.129
Since 2004, an additional twenty-one detention facilities have been added to the BIA’s
inventory, including at least two juvenile facilities.130 As of 2013, seven more juvenile
facilities were slated to open in the next few years.131 Following the 2004 report,
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Congress increased the Bureau’s detention budget: it grew from $43.8 million in 2005
to $64.7 million in 2009.132
The Inspector General followed up on its 2004 investigation in 2011 in order
to determine how the BIA spent the increased funding.133 According to that report,
staffing shortages persisted and the BIA’s financial management system made it difficult to track how the money was spent.134 The report also noted the “egregious physical
condition” of the facilities visited by inspectors.135 By 2009, according to the 2011
report, the BIA’s inventory included ninety-four facilities: twenty-three operated by
the BIA, fifty-two operated by tribes under self-determination contracts, and nineteen
operated by tribes under self-governance compacts.136
Tribal juvenile incarceration facilities today house mostly nonviolent offenders,
particularly because violent and serious offenders are more likely to be prosecuted in
federal court.137 Nationally, arrests of Native American youth for violent crimes have
fallen since the mid-1990s, as have arrests for violent crime among all youth.138 The
Violent Crime Index rate for Native American youth was higher than it was for white
youth in 1995, but by 2010 it had fallen below the rate for white youth.139 Although
national data does not include youth under tribal jurisdiction, it provides a picture of
the overall trend, and the tribal data summarized here does not suggest that violent
crime is any more common among youth under tribal jurisdiction. Yet, within tribal
systems, the investment in juvenile incarceration continued throughout this period.
The specter of violent youth crime can provide an easy justification for the
emphasis on incarceration.140 For example, I represented a tribe seeking to compel the
BIA to operate the newly constructed low-security juvenile facility on its reservation
without requiring the tribe to retrofit the facility to meet the highest security standards. Explaining the BIA’s policy at the time to operate only high-security, regional
juvenile detention facilities, the official in charge of detention facility funding for the
BIA explained that he needed a place to house all the “rapists and murders” from
elsewhere in Indian country.141 According to national statistics, however, only five of
the youth held in designated Indian country juvenile facilities at mid-year 2007 were
being held for rape and only seven for “other violent” offenses.142 This was, of course,
only a single statement by one official and may not have truly reflected agency policy,
or even his personal beliefs. His invocation of an imagined violent juvenile criminal,
however, echoes the academic and political rhetoric about a coming generation of
violent juvenile offenders that drove nationwide investment in juvenile criminalization
and incarceration during the 1990s.143
More funding for incarceration has been put forth as the primary answer to
almost every problem related to criminal justice in Indian country, including high
crime rates, lack of general law enforcement infrastructure, unsafe facilities, and poor
oversight of the detention program. As Mauer explains of nationwide prison population growth, “changes in criminal justice policy, rather than changes in crime rates,
have been the most significant contributors” to the growth in prisons and the prison
population.144 It is significant in the tribal context, where crime rates and the number
of juveniles in secure confinement have actually decreased, that not one of the federal
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reports cited in this article called for a moratorium on building any new secure juvenile facilities in Indian country.
In order to build their justice systems, tribes rely on the federal government for
financial, personnel and technical assistance, so Congressional and agency priorities
drive tribal choices. If the goal is to reduce juvenile overincarceration, the story of this
era suggests that the federal government has been leading tribes in the wrong direction.145 To the extent that tribes continue to advocate for more funding to support
incarceration, the available data raise questions about whether incarceration is a necessary or helpful intervention for Indian country youth. On the other hand, it is also
possible that the declining population of juveniles in secure confinement may indicate
a shift in tribal courts’ willingness to incarcerate juveniles for nonviolent offenses. If
this is the case, future federal funding policies should prioritize treatment and alternatives to incarceration, including construction of nonsecure facilities if they are needed.

Prisons and the Criminalization of Minority Groups
If imprisonment can’t be entirely explained as a response to a violent crime wave,
what factors explain its rise and persistence? Prisons have been a key feature of social
control. Rules of criminal law are a primary means by which a sovereign prescribes
rules of conduct and ensures a degree of safety, security, and interpersonal cooperation
in a society composed of strangers.146 The power to imprison is one way that governments can enforce compliance with these rules. The machinery of criminal justice,
from police surveillance to the inside of the prisons themselves—characterized by
controlled movement, austere conditions, lack of privacy and freedom, and the threat
of violent discipline—serves to remind all people, and those in prison especially, of
the government’s power to control people.147 In the European and American context,
prisons have increased in importance as other methods of punishment, such as the
death penalty, physical torture, banishment, and public humiliation, have declined.148
Today, prisons are so central to American criminal justice that it’s easy to forget that
locking people in cages is neither the only, nor necessarily the best, way to ensure
public safety, security, and interpersonal cooperation.
In the United States, imprisonment has also been a primary means of containing,
controlling, and “reforming” oppressed classes, including poor people, immigrant
groups, African Americans, and indigenous peoples.149 Disempowered groups have
been contained through other means as well, and the use of criminal imprisonment has
increased in importance as the other methods of control have declined. For example,
Alexander argues that mass incarceration replaced the Jim Crow laws that replaced
slavery as a legal method of ensuring the continued subordination and control of
African Americans.150 Racial stratification provides a particularly compelling explanation for the most recent (post-1970) rise in imprisonment in the United States. The
rise in the imprisoned population since the 1970s is largely attributable to a rise in the
number of Black and Brown people in prison. People of color today are more likely to
be imprisoned than white people for the same types of offenses, and they tend to be
imprisoned for longer periods.151
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Ross provides a pointed explanation of criminal justice as a mechanism of
racial control over Native Americans. 152 “We are reminded,” she writes, “that Indian
country had no prisons” before colonization. Tribal communities administered criminal justice through methods like restitution and banishment.153 Beginning with the
Major Crimes Act of 1885, which authorized the federal government for the first
time to prosecute criminal offenses that occurred within tribal communities, the
federal government began the process of delegitimizing tribal criminal justice institutions and, through federal law and policy, pushing tribes to recreate their justice
systems following a Western model, which has had imprisonment at its center since
the early-twentieth century. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, this
process continued. Laws such as the Indian Reorganization Act encouraged tribes to
remake their governments and rewrite their constitutions in the mold of a business
council, and Public Law 280 gave certain state governments the authority to extend
their criminal justice systems into Indian country. In Indian country, prisons and
punitive criminal justice were very specifically introduced as methods of assimilation
and containment.154
The simple hypothesis is often offered that minorities face high rates of imprisonment due to high rates of criminality: these groups of people go to prison more
often because they commit more crimes. This explanation presumes a neutral, static
definition of crime that obscures the role that definitions of crime have played in
determining who will be considered criminal. But in fact, the reasoning behind the
decision to classify certain behaviors as illegal, and how to sanction them—that is,
whether to subject them to criminal (as opposed to civil) sanctions, and whether to
impose imprisonment for their violation—can vary dramatically.155 For example, the
rise in imprisonment of Black men since the 1970s can be largely explained by long
prison sentences imposed for relatively low-level drug crimes.156 Black women end
up in jail in part because their reproductive and childrearing decisions are the target
of criminal sanctions.157 Early juvenile justice systems reached much more broadly
than adult criminal systems, permitting children to be locked up for a range of
common misbehaviors by labeling them incorrigible. A look behind the broad label
reveals that children deemed in need of intervention (poor and minority children)
were labeled as delinquent for typical childhood acts such as disobeying parents
or being outside past curfew. Girls in particular were often locked up for behavior
deemed too sexual.158
In political and public rhetoric, “crime” can be made interchangeable with “violence.”
When politicians and others invoke a fear of violent crime to justify a platform of
tough-on-crime measures, or passage of a specific law, this rhetoric can mask the actual
cause of any increase in crime: changes in laws that criminalize more behaviors and
send people to jail for longer periods.159 Gilmore, for example, has described how the
initiative process, driven by rhetoric about fear of crime, was responsible for several
key legislative changes that helped increase the population of prisoners in California,
including a three-strikes law and sentence enhancements for gang members. These
laws, together with a national-level trend toward recriminalization of drug offenses
and the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders, ensnared
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many more Black and Latino Californians in the net of the criminal law.160 Although
technically an “increase in crime,” rather than resulting from a more violent population,
this increase was a consequence of laws that criminalized more behaviors and targeted
specific communities.
Native people were categorized as deviant as a class by settlers who defined their
cultures as dysfunctional, which rendered them vulnerable to a range of coercive forms
of state intervention intended to fix those deviant cultures. During the same era as the
Major Crimes Act, the BIA created the Courts of Indian Offenses. The first Westernstyle courts in Indian country, these courts were viewed as vehicles of education and
assimilation.161 They were governed by regulatory codes that defined as criminal, and
punished, a range of activities associated with being Native, such as plural marriage,
certain religious dances, and the practices of medicine people.162 Native people were
criminalized during this period for acts of resistance, arrested for vagrancy, grand
larceny, and arson for burning down the jails that confined them or stealing horses and
cattle from white settlers.163
Today, many of the crimes committed by Native youth might similarly be explained
as a result of the criminalization of trauma. Native youth face trauma that has been
linked to the consequences of colonization, forced assimilation, and federal policies
that have damaged tribal families, communities, and cultures. A look at the offenses
committed by Native youth might suggest the need for a juvenile justice system focused
on meeting the needs of low-level offenders and offenders with trauma, mental health,
and substance abuse issues. It might incorporate trauma and mental health services, as
well as alcohol and drug treatment services. Acknowledging historical trauma and its
impact on family and child well-being, it might strive to keep youth connected to their
families and communities wherever possible, rather than sending youth to faraway
states or to non-Native systems. It might avoid the military-style discipline that was
a hallmark of assimilative boarding schools and is especially damaging to youth who
have experienced abuse and trauma. It might employ incarceration as the last possible
option and, given the infrequent occurrence of serious violent crimes among Native
youth, most tribal systems may not use it at all. More radically, a tribe might revise
its juvenile delinquency laws so as not to criminalize relatively minor misbehavior,
such as truancy or underage drinking, or behavior directly tied to addiction, such as
certain drug offenses. Instead, behavior directly related to trauma often brings those
youth under the jurisdiction of tribal juvenile delinquency laws, and the resulting
juvenile crime statistics are put forth as evidence that more juvenile detention facilities
are needed.

Prison Economics
Once they are built, prisons can be self-perpetuating. They create employment and
revenue, and communities become dependent on them as profit generators and sources
of jobs. Gilmore, in her study of prison expansion in California, highlighted the
economic draw of a prison for the rural towns in which most were located.164 Lynch,
who wrote about Arizona’s prison boom, described the way that concerns about the
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cost of prisons combined with tough-on-crime rhetoric in order to birth a particular
kind of prison, one that favors security, punishment, and extraction of labor from
prisoners.165 Lichtenstein, writing about prison expansion in the southwestern United
States, emphasized the role of economics and described the various players, from
governmental entities to private firms, that profited from prison expansion.166 The
economic side of prisons, including the financial incentives to build them, the industries that profit from them, and the internal and external financial pressures that
operate to keep them open, reveals that the choice to build prisons is never simply
a matter of criminal justice policy. It also demonstrates that the enormous financial
investment in prisons can obscure and even undercut other possible methods of
addressing crime.
For Indian tribes, local poverty and federal funding shortages create an atmosphere
in which economic development and finding funding for core government programs is
an enormous concern. Tribal communities are thus particularly fertile ground for the
idea that prison might provide its own ongoing funding and even generate additional
jobs and revenue. During the time period covered in this article, more tribes requested
funding for construction of incarceration facilities than could be accommodated even
by Congress’ authorization of new money for correctional facility construction and
operation that peaked in 2003 to 2004. One strategy employed by BIA officials was
to encourage tribal leaders to plan and build facilities with additional bed space that
could be rented out to other jurisdictions, producing income that the tribe could
use to operate its facility in the absence of available federal money. In particular,
they encouraged tribes to pursue contracts with the US Marshals Service and US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Relying on income from contract beds would
mean building a larger facility than is required to meet tribal (or even regional) needs,
and it may also require a facility built to accommodate and control more violent and
serious offenders than the population under tribal jurisdiction. In this scenario, a
focus on revenue can potentially obscure a focus on the public safety needs of the
tribal community.
But the real effects on the community go far beyond jobs and revenue. A tribe
seeking to maximize the economic impact of a prison may build it to accommodate
the needs of a nonlocal population. For juveniles, this population is likely to be more
violent than the youth in the local community. The size and security level may be
much greater than what is needed to accommodate the local population. Once the
prison is open, it may require specially trained staff, so the opportunities for local
employment may be slim until local people can be trained in prison management.
A tribe may even choose to hire a private company to run its prison. Bringing in
outside offenders, staff, and even administrators can dramatically impact the community. One possible effect that has not been studied involves what happens once the
offenders are released: might some offenders choose to remain in the community?
Will the tribe (already lacking employment options) be responsible for providing
reentry services?
It may also impact the way that a tribe treats its own youth. Because funding
(whether from the federal government or from contract sources) is typically based
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on the number of detainees held in the facility, tribes may feel pressure to keep the
beds full, either through contracts or by placing youth from the community in the
prison, whether or not their offenses actually require incarceration. The need to keep
the prison full may also limit the resources available for alternative programs. Some
of these issues are exacerbated for remote tribal communities. They may face the task
of building an entire facility for a small number of juvenile offenders simply because
there is nowhere else nearby to put them. Scarce funding for justice systems may
make tribes even more likely to turn to prisons as revenue generators. Yet, once the
facilities are open, they may consume most of the available justice system resources.
For tribal communities with few private organizations providing services related to
juvenile justice, this can leave courts with no other disposition options for juveniles.
For example, I attended a recent meeting where a small group of people was asked
to brainstorm options for reducing reliance on secure detention of juveniles. One
member of the group, the head of a juvenile detention facility, explained how the existence of an investment in a detention facility could impact any effort to reduce juvenile
incarceration. If the tribe placed more youth in alternative settings, his facility would
not be filled, and the resulting drop in federal funding may mean that the tribe could
no longer afford to operate the facility.
Prisons take on a life of their own in this cycle: once they are built, governments
find prisoners to fill them, often creating criminals out of people who would have been
dealt with through noncriminal laws in an earlier era, or incarcerating offenders who
might be better served through alternative measures. Because they employ so many
people and their operation is tied to ongoing funding, it can become politically difficult
to close them. Once a jail or prison is operational, its administrators must find money
to keep it open, preserving the building and the jobs. Because funding is often determined by the number of prisoners, there is pressure to keep prisons full. As Mauer
observes, newly constructed prisons “can be expected to endure and imprison for at
least 50 years, virtually guaranteeing a . . . commitment to a high rate of incarceration.
The growth of the system itself serves to create a set of institutionalized lobbying
forces that perpetuate a societal commitment to imprisonment through the expansion
of vested economic interests.”167
In the tribal context, this happens in the form of heavier reliance on incarceration
as a solution to juvenile delinquency by Native youth and by entering into contracts
with other jurisdictions to rent facility space. Sentencing policy may also be influenced,
as expensive prisons become the centerpiece of most justice systems, drawing funding
and attention away from other options, such a treatment facilities or community-based
programs. Worse yet, efforts to keep prisons full can be too successful, resulting in
overcrowding and necessitating the building of new prisons.
The confluence of factors leading to our current overreliance on incarceration is not
simple, but the myth of a terrible crime wave necessitating a response of imprisonment
has been convincingly discredited in the nontribal context. It is disconcerting, then,
that the arc of tribal juvenile justice policy over the past fifteen years has continued
to follow the path of highlighting crime statistics, building more facilities to accommodate this perceived need, finding problems with the facilities, and directing more
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funding toward facilities in order to address the problems. The number of secure
detention facilities in Indian country has grown during this time period, and there is
evidence that the institutions themselves are more restrictive (although they may also
be safer) than they were two decades ago. Yet, it is not clear that the perceived threat
of violent crime has ever been true in the juvenile context. In that such a process can
happen without any decision-maker explicitly intending to pursue it, overincarceration
is a structural phenomenon. Tribes seeking to strengthen and reform their juvenile
justice systems (both in 1998 and again in 2016) can easily inherit this cycle, so that
tribal justice systems can accidentally perpetuate the incarceration bias even if the
tribal leaders did not intend to increase juvenile incarceration.
Communities have a choice in how they respond to crime, and imprisonment,
though sometime publicly favored, is not the only option for most. Only a small
handful of offenders are so dangerous that they cannot be released into the community. In the juvenile context the number of offenders who might require imprisonment
is even smaller, as even serious juvenile offenders may benefit from treatment and
intervention services. Moreover, the most serious Indian country offenders are typically prosecuted in federal court. Given the scarce financial resources available in
tribal communities, the limits on tribal incarceration imposed by federal law, and
the types of offenses being committed by Native youth, directing money to secure
facilities seems, at best, to be a poor choice of investment. And yet, the number of
secure juvenile facilities in Indian country grew alongside the prison boom that was
occurring elsewhere.

Conclusion
This article is intended to provide a critical look at how and why incarceration happens
in Indian country and its effect on Native youth. Despite widespread agreement
that incarceration does little to reduce juvenile crime, is not necessary for nonviolent
offenders, and may even be harming Native juvenile offenders, incarceration continued
to be a centerpiece of tribal juvenile justice policy during the period described here.
This was partly a result of federal laws and policies, which limit the practical choices
available to tribes and subtly influence the character of tribal juvenile justice systems.
There is reason to hope that things will change. The two agencies with primary
responsibility for juvenile and criminal justice in Indian country recently collaborated on a Long Term Plan to Build and Enhance Tribal Justice Systems. Drawn
from consultation with tribal leaders, a primary recommendation of this report
was that alternatives to incarceration should be “the major focus” of any long-term
plan; it also contained detailed recommendations related to decreasing the use of
incarceration and increasing resources for rehabilitation and treatment for youth.168
This means that tribes are speaking up about, and federal officials are listening to,
their desire to depart from the mass incarceration model of criminal and juvenile
justice that has dominated in jurisdictions across the United States for the past
thirty to forty years. Recently, the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention
Alternatives Initiative ( JDAI), a major, privately funded effort to reduce reliance
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on incarceration in juvenile justice systems, began a pilot Tribal JDAI project with
the Mississippi Band of Choctaw.169 In addition, the BIA is updating its Model
Indian Juvenile Code to better incorporate alternatives to incarceration.170 The
combination of a shift in federal policy and the involvement of a major private foundation, both favoring a turn away from juvenile incarceration, may mean that over
the next decade tribal justice systems will develop an increased focus on treating
youth and minimize their reliance on imprisonment. Even if tribes remain at the
mercy of shifts in federal policy, the immediate future, at least, may be shifting in a
better direction.
However, as this article has pointed out, mass incarceration is also about a
cycle that is structural: the powerful pull to invest in prisons, the efforts required
to keep them open, and the way efforts to fill prisons can create a cycle that leads
to the need for more prisons and brings more and more vulnerable people into the
cycle of incarceration. What could be a solution to the overincarceration of Native
youth—strengthening and expanding tribal juvenile justice systems—might actually be
contributing to the problem. Changing this story will require going beyond the current
rhetoric about self-determination. It will require tribal leaders willing to thoughtfully
address the role of incarceration in their juvenile justice systems, and federal agencies willing to throw financial and advisory support behind the careful choices that
tribes make.
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Notes
1. The federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act requires that states monitor the
“the disproportionate number of juvenile members of minority groups, who come in contact with the
juvenile justice system;” see 42 USC §5633(a)(22). While the law originally referred to disproportionate minority “confinement” (see Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act Amendments
of 1988, H. Rep. No. 100-605, 10), it was amended in 2002 to expand the requirement from
“confinement” to “contact”; see 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization
Act, Public Law No. 107-273, div. C, tit. II, §12209, 116 Stat. 1758, 1878 (2002). Abbreviated as
“DMC,” disproportionate minority contact has become a term of art referring to any decision point
at which racial minority youth receive the more punitive of available options at rates higher than their
proportion in the general population. This might include arrest (as opposed to release), out-of-home
placement (as opposed to in-home placement), placement in secure confinement (as opposed to
in-home placement or placement in a nonsecure setting), and transfer to adult court (as opposed to
remaining in the juvenile system). For a discussion of the history and implementation of the DMC
requirement, see generally US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, Disproportionate Minority Contact Technical Assistance Manual, 4th ed. ( July 2009), ojjdp.
gov/compliance/dmc_ta_manual.pdf.
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2. Native American people make up about 1% of the total national population. Some counts
include people who identify as American Indian or Alaska Native only (AI/AN-only), while others
also include those who identify as American Indian or Alaska Native in combination with another
race (AI/AIN+). AI/AN-only are 0.8% of the total population, and AI/AN+ are 1.7% of the total
population; see US Census Bureau, 2014 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates (2014),
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_1YR/CP05. For this reason, data sets
that compare disposition of juvenile offenders by racial group often do not include enough Native
American youth to make the results statistically significant.
3. Throughout this article, I use incarceration and secure confinement as generic terms to describe
any arrangement in which an offender is held in a locked facility for the primary purpose of deterrence, community safety, or retribution, including offenders serving short and long terms, offenders
held pre- or post-adjudication, and facilities offering some treatment and rehabilitation services.
Recognizing that the term prison in criminal justice literature refers to a specific type of postadjudication facility for adult offenders, I nevertheless use the popular term “prisons” in this article as
shorthand for all types of secure criminal justice facilities in discussions of general trends.
4. As described in notes 35–44 of this essay, Native youth experience disproportionately
harsh sanctions at multiple decision points, including being more likely to be placed out of the
home and more likely to be placed in secure confinement. Examples of disparities in particular
state and county systems are collected in Neelum Arya and Addie C. Rolnick, “A Tangled Web of
Justice: American Indian and Alaska Native Youth in Federal, State, and Tribal Justice Systems”
(Campaign for Youth Justice policy brief, 2008), 20–24, campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/
CFYJPB_TangledJustice.pdf.
5. This number refers to new facilities built to accommodate juvenile offenders, including standalone juvenile facilities and combined juvenile/adult facilities. To obtain it, I reviewed the Bureau of
Justice Statistics’ annual “Jails in Indian Country” report, which provides information on facilities in
the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ inventory, and compared the number of facilities designated (by name)
as juvenile facilities in 1997 and 2013. As further described in this article’s subsection “Incarceration
of Youth Under Tribal Jurisdiction,” this count is based on the best available federal data regarding
Indian country facilities and supplemented with informal counts from reports and other sources. The
lack of availability of Indian country crime and justice data has made it difficult for any entity to arrive
at a definitive answer to questions that may seems simple in other jurisdictions, such as the number
of facilities operational in any given year, how many of those include separate housing for juveniles, or
what offenses were committed by the juveniles being held in them. A complete accounting will require
visiting every facility in the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ inventory and gathering information from tribes
about additional facilities, a task no one has yet accomplished. This article therefore relies on the best
available information, recognizing that the information is incomplete and at times contradictory.
6. As described more fully in this article’s subsection “Incarceration of Youth Under Tribal
Jurisdiction,” the total mid-year count of juveniles in all Indian country facilities, including any
juveniles being held as adults or in adult holding facilities, was 303 in 1998 and 190 in 2014. In the
intervening years, it has reached a high of 312, but has not been above 300 since 2004.
7. Indian Law and Order Commission, A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer: Report
to the President & Congress of the United States (November 2013), 157, 166–67, aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/
report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf; US Department of Justice,
Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on American Indian/Alaska Native Children Exposed to
Violence, Ending Violence so Children Can Thrive (November 2014), 110–13, 119–21. justice.gov/
sites/default/files/defendingchildhood/pages/attachments/2014/11/18/finalaianreport.pdf.
8. For example, the website for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention sets
forth the agency’s current vision that young people’s contact with the justice system should be “rare,
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fair, and beneficial.” US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
Vision Statement, ojjdp.gov/about/missionstatement.html. Outside of Indian country, the past two
decades have seen a gradual shift from a punitive focus on juvenile justice to a belief that children
should be treated differently from adults, including avoiding incarceration whenever possible. Addie
C. Rolnick, “Untangling the Web: Juvenile Justice in Indian Country,” NYU Journal of Legislation &
Public Policy 19, no. 1, 75–77 (2016), nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Rolnick-JuvenileJustice-in-Indian-Country-19nyujlpp49.pdf.
9. Mona Lynch, Sunbelt Justice: Arizona and the Transformation of American Punishment
(Stanford University Press, 2010), 9–16. At page 13, Lynch notes that, “although all 50 states in the
United States have experienced massive growth in their imprisonment rates over this period, those
rates vary dramatically from state to state and regionally, as do the qualitative aspects of punishment
and the rates of minority overrepresentation relative to the general jurisdictional demographics.”
10. I capitalize the terms Black and Brown (the latter referring to non-Black, nonwhite people,
including Native Americans), as well as Native, in order to acknowledge that racial designations are
not simply neutral descriptions of color, but refer to constructed and legally significant categories. For
a detailed analysis of the construction of the Indian racial and legal category, see Addie C. Rolnick,
“The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy,” NYU Law Review 86, no. 4
(October 2011), 965n31, nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-86-4-Rolnick.
pdf. Moreover, the experience of people of color at the subordinated end of a constructed racial
hierarchy has created social and political identities grounded in racial categories, identities that are
best represented by capitalizing the terms Black, Brown, and Native. I use the term Native whenever
possible, except that I use Indian to refer to a specific legal designation.
11. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New
York: The New Press, 2010), 9–11. At page 13, Alexander explains that mass incarceration “refers not
only to the criminal justice system but also to the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that
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http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_1YR/S0201//popgroup~006; http://
factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/S1501.
28. In 2012, 13.9% of AI/AN-only people over the age of 25 had a bachelor’s degree or higher,
compared to 29.3% of the general population; see US Census Bureau, 2014 American Community
Survey, http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_1YR/S0201//popgroup~006;
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“An Interpretation of the National DMC Relative Rate Indices for Juvenile Justice System Processing
in 2010,” National Disproportionate Minority Contact Databook (December 2013), prepared by the
National Center for Juvenile Justice for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 4,
ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/pdf/dmc_interpretations.pdf.
40. According to data collected from state juvenile justice systems by the W. Haywood Burns
Institute, Native youth across all states are incarcerated at a rate of 329 per 100,000. This rate is
greater than the rate for white youth (98) and for all youth of color (263). In Nebraska, Native
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44. Arya and Rolnick, “A Tangled Web,” 22, citing John Poupart, John Redhorse, Melanie
Peterson-Hickey, and Mary Martin, “Searching for Justice: American Indian Perspectives on
Disparities in Minnesota Criminal Justice System” (August 2005), 15–16, crimeandjustice.org/
researchReports/American%20Indian%20Perspectives%20on%20Disparities%20in%20the%20
Minnesota%20Criminal%20Justice%20System.pdf.
45. Benjamin Chambers and Annie Balck, “Because Kids Are Different: Five Opportunities for
Reforming the Juvenile Justice System,” (December 9, 2014), John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation Models for Change Resource Center Partnership: Systems Reform in Juvenile Justice,
modelsforchange.net/publications/718.
46. Richard A. Mendel, “The Missouri Model: Reinventing the Practice of Rehabilitating
Youthful Offenders” (The Annie E. Casey Foundation: 2010), 5, aecf.org/resources/the-missourimodel/; Youth Transition Funders Group, “Juvenile Justice Reform: A Blueprint” (2012), 15, ytfg.
org/2012/01/juvenile-justice-reform-a-blueprint/.
47. Richard A. Mendel, “No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration” (The
Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2011), aecf.org/resources/no-place-for-kids-full-report/.
48. Indian Law and Order Commission, Roadmap 166–67; Attorney General’s Advisory
Committee, Ending Violence, 119.
49. Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, Ending Violence, 24, 27, 112, 119.
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82

à à à

A merican Indian Culture and R esearch Journal 40:1 (2016)

criminal jurisdiction over a citizen; see also Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974), affirming
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over citizens for offenses related to treaty rights occurring in
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